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Efficient coordination in the lab
Abstract
In an infinitely repeated matching pennies game with asymmetric infor-
mation, Gossner et al. (2006) studied coordination levels among agents and
obtained that players may use a block codification using signaling mistakes in
order to efficiently coordinate. Inspired in that model, we experimentally test
coordination in the lab. We first model and establish the appropriate length
of the sequence played by nature and the block strategy for a finitely repeated
version of the game, where the majority rule with 3-length blocks results as the
optimal block codification. Our experimental data give support to the main
results of the original model with respect to the codification rule using signaling
mistakes.
Keywords: coordination game, experiment, cheap-talk
JEL codes: D8, C91, C73
1 Introduction
Strategic information transmission is a process that plays a crucial role in many
situations in which agents’ decisions depend on disclosure information. In fact, the
lack of information is one of main drawbacks to reach agreements. Hence, sharing
information is a pivotal point that allows agents to get more profitable agreements.
Furthermore, there exists a trade-off between revealed information and profit, which
is due to strategic concerns. In Crawford and Sobel’s (1982) words, revealing all
information to the opponent is not usually the most advantageous policy. As Blume
and Ortmann (2007) highlight, costless messages help overcome strategic uncertainty,
problems equilibrium selection as well as coordination failure.
As a benchmark structure, information transmission between a sender and a re-
ceiver occurs when a message in a common language is sent through a transmission
channel. Specifically, the sender is an agent with private information who sends a
message revealing “some” information to the receiver, who takes a decision affecting
both agents accordingly. The present work concerns strategic information transmis-
sion under asymmetric information.
In their seminal paper Crawford and Sobel (1982) introduced an one-sided com-
munication model between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver and show
how the conflict of interest has a negative effect on the flow of information. Based
in that seminal model, there is a large number of applications of strategic informa-
tion transmission. For example, applications to corporations (Watson, 1996; Kartik,
2005), to operation management (Allon and Bassamboo, 2011; Allon et al., 2011) or
to political sciences (Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1989; Krishna and Morgan, 2001).
Some of our setting’s features are in common with Crawford and Sobel’s frame-
work: 1) Information is transmitted in an one-sided communication channel. 2) The
sender, player 1, is a fully informed player who has complete and perfect information
about nature. While the receiver, player 2, is an uninformed player who knows about
the no-player existence and actions in the past. 3) Sharing information is costless for
the sender. 4) Decisions of the receiver have an effect on both players’ payoffs.
Some other features are specific to our communication protocol, already intro-
duced in Gossner et al. (2003): 5) The sender and receiver form a team with aligned
interests. 6) Players play against the Nature modelized as an i.i.d. process. 7) The
team and the Nature face decisions repeatedly. 8) The sender has private informa-
tion on the future state of nature; while the receiver has public information about the
history of nature’s past states. 9) There is a positive gain when both players match
nature’s,
From a theoretical perspective, Gossner et al. (2003) characterize the equilibrium
payoff that the team can both guarantee and defend against any behavior of the
Nature. As it is already mentioned, the Nature behaves as an i.i.d. process, therefore
the value (in correlated strategies) of the repeated zero sum game where the sender
and the receiver play as a team against the Nature is related with their equilibrium
payoff. Moreover, they construct equilibrium strategies of communication between
the sender and the receiver in this infinitely repeated set-up based on block1 coding.
To be precise, block coding strategies refer to the way how players communicate their
following sequence of actions. Actually, the sequence of actions pairs are chopped in
blocks and each block conveys information for the next block of actions pairs. The
codification skills allow to the players to achieve the target payoff and to guarantee
1This technique is not new in the literature of repeated games under asymmetric information
(AADIR BIBLIOGRAFIA).
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stability conditions. In this setup, the transmission information is only meanwhile the
play, the sequence of actions played by the sender are encrypted working as messages,
and the receiver decodes messages according to a common team’s codebook.
The aim of this paper is to contrast whether under asymmetric uncertainty be-
tween players but still being dominant2 to transmit information, individuals actually
implement such a kind of “block strategies”. To do so, we have adapted the above
situation to be properly contrasted in a controlled environment as a experimental
laboratory. First, we provide a theoretical characterization of optimal block strate-
gies considering that players interact a finite number of periods. Second, fixing the
majority rule with blocks of size three, we establish the corresponding length of the
game. We obtain the duration of 55 periods. These two features were the parameters
used to run an experiment that fits the model and tests its robustness in the lab.
In our experiment, we implement a specific channel for communication between
players. Before the game, a chat is activated during 3 minutes. In this time, players
had the possibility to write free messages designing their strategies without explicit
cost. This chat allowed to the players to fix the common3 codebook and the decod-
ification rules that players may eventually perform. Once the chat was closed, the





). Player 1 was informed of all of them since in his/her screen a matrix
of all realizations was active the whole sequence of actions. The play lates 55 stages
and the information available for each player was different. At stage t, player 1 had
in the screen the whole sequence of action of the Nature, his/her actions played so far
and the sequence of action of the other player played until this stage. Nevertheless,
player 2 had the whole history of the action triples of length t− 1: Nature, the other
player and their own sequence of actions played until this stage. In all this phase,
verbal communication was forbidden. Therefore, Player 1 that knew how the Nature
plays in the future may signal to player 2 by using his/her own actions some event to
reach better coordination. How much information was transmitted depends on how
informative the signal of player 1 was and how receptive player 2 was in receiving
the signal. This eventually determined the payoff of the two players as the number
of concordance with the Nature’s actions.
We analyse the effectiveness of the chat in transmitting information in the terms
of the theoretical model. That is, without specifically analysing what the messages
in the chat contain, we test whether and how much do players coordinate under such
2Given that there is a positive gain when both players match nature’s, the sender has an incentive
to share information in order to improve his own gains. Thus, actions’ coordination is possible being
a strictly dominant strategy for both players.
3This phase fits the assumption in Gossner et al. (2003) of the common set of strategies.
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conditions and, therefore, whether the model predicts reasonable strategies that could
be observed from real heterogeneous agents.
Among our main experimental results we find that subjects design strategies at
three levels of coordination. First, strategies at low level where the receiver ignores or
misunderstands the sender’s message, coordinating actions by pure chance. Second, a
medium level of coordination in which strategies transmit successfully information by
following a joint coordination code. A third level of coordination, the richest, where
coordination codes achieve payoffs close to the optimal predicted by the theoretical
model.
Additionally, we estimate the theoretical model with the data obtained in the
experiment and find that actions by the receiver are significantly explained by actions
played by the nature and the sender. With respect to senders, their signals are precise
most of the times.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature on strategic
information transmission. In Section 3 we describe the game and the theoretical
framework. Section 4 explains in detail the experimental environment. In Section 5
we describe the data analysis and highlight the main results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related literature
Needless to say, strategic transmission of private information deals to many areas re-
lated to economics and political sciences, as clearly stated in Sobel’s (2010) literature
review. A quick look at the state of the art on unmediated communication classifies
this type of research into two categories. First, cheap talk games, where information is
unverifiable and players can lie at no cost.4 Second, games of persuasion or verifiable
disclosure, since it is assumed that information is verifiable and agents can conceal
information but not lie.5 Our set up is directly related with the first category.
The large strand of cheap talk literature was initiated by Crawford and Sobel
(1982) where, primary related to the theory of bargaining, an informed sender sends
a possibly noisy signal based on his private information to an uninformed receiver,
who then takes an action that determines the welfare of both. The authors show
that when there is some, but not complete, common interest imprecise talk may be
necessary and sufficient to sustain credibility. This credibility constraint is necessary
for equilibrium communication. Under milder conditions on that of Grawford and
Sobel, the recent work by Agastya et al. (2015) completes the analysis by establishing
4See Farrell and Rabin (1996) for an exhaustive survey.
5Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981) are seminal papers of this line of research.
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that almost full revelation obtains as the two players preferences get arbitrarily close
to each other.
Our main reference, Gossner et al. (2006), is also central in this line of research.
In their model, a sender transmits information to the receiver without incentives to
cheat. Furthermore, randomness is modeled as a binary, uniform random variable
that represents the state of the world. Uncertainty is privately unveiled to the sender
but not to the receiver. Although within a different modelisation of uncertainty,
Agastya et al. (2014) analyze a context in which the sender has expertise on some
but not all the payoff-relevant factors. Such an uncertainty can either improve or
worsen the quality of transmitted information, which depends on the effective bias.
For symmetrically distributed uncertainty or quadratic loss functions, the authors
highlight three results: the quality of information transmission is independent of the
riskiness of that uncertainty, it may be suboptimal to allocate authority to the in-
formed player, and despite players’ preferences being arbitrarily close, it is impossible
to hold that the receiver prefers delegation over authority or vice versa.
Common to Crawford and Sobel, in Gossner et al.’s model, information transmis-
sion does not have an explicit cost. However, there is an implicit cost that comes
from the trade-off between the cost and benefit of information transmission. Specific
contexts with costly communication are offered by Sobel (2012) and Hertel and Smith
(2013). In the first, it is studied the case in which both sender and receiver undertake
a costly acquisition of communication capacity. The author points out that models
where communication is costly and preferences are aligned can have parallel results to
models of costless communication and not aligned preferences. In particular, for any
communication cost or difference in preferences, full communication is not possible
and failure to communicate is always possible. In the second paper, Hertel and Smith
introduce discrete and costly communication in the Crawford ant Sobel’s setup. The
underlying idea is that words are scarce and costly. The sender can communicate only
through the use of discrete messages which are ordered by cost. The state space is
richer than the space of messages, since the state space is infinite while the number of
messages is finite. The model captures realism since it is impossible to communicate
to others the complexity of the real world. Therefore, the precision of communica-
tion may be enhanced by expending more in costly effort. In addition, the size of
language endogenously emerges due to the cost of communication. As a main result,
when players preferences are not aligned, an increase in communication costs may
improve communication itself.
Some of the theoretical model just mentioned have been also tested in the lab.
Crawford (1998) reviews the experimental literature on communication games, and
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Devetag and Ortmann (2007) critically revise some research on coordination failure in
the lab experimental studies on coordination games with Pareto-ranked equilibrium.
Charness and Grosskopf (2004) analyze which components might make cheap talk
effective in the setting of coordination games. In particular, they design an experiment
based on a two-player game to test whether information provision about the other
player’s action, and whether costless one-way messages before actions are taken have
some influence on coordination. They find that information provision about the other
person’s play only enhances coordination when messages are allowed.
Through an experimental approach, Blume and Ortmann (2007) investigate the
effects of costless pre-play communication in symmetric coordination games of the
stag hung variety. They find that with repeated interaction cheap talk preceding
games with Pareto-ranked equilibria can substantially facilitate player’s coordination
on the Pareto-dominant equilibrium.
The Hertel and Smith (2013) model on costly and discrete communication is
contrasted in a laboratory by Duffy et al. (2014). These authors find that the size
of the language endogenously emerges as a function of the costs of communication:
higher communication costs are associated with a smaller language. They find that
the sender payoffs, relative to equilibrium payoffs, are decreasing in cost, whereas
the receiver payoffs, relative to equilibrium payoffs, are increasing in cost. Moreover,
over-communication is also found.
3 Theoretical framework
Our theoretical set-up is based on previous work by Gossner et al. (2003, 2006).
3.1 The one-shot game
Consider the following game with asymmetric information. Nature, player 1 and
player 2 choose an action 0 or 1, denoted by x, y and z respectively.
If all agents take the same action, player 1 and 2 receive a 1 payoff, and a zero
payoff otherwise. The payoff function for players in the one-shot version of this game
is represented in normal form as,
g(x, y, z) =
{
1 if x = y = z
0 otherwise
(1)
It can also be represented in matrix way:
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z = 0 z = 1 z = 0 z = 1
y = 0 1 0 y = 0 0 0
y = 1 0 0 y = 1 0 1
x = 0 x = 1
where nature chooses the matrix, player 1 chooses the row, and player 2 chooses
the column. Players 1 and 2 have a common payoff function and, therefore, their
incentives are aligned.
In the n-stage version of the game, nature plays a random sequence of actions




) sequence. Before the game is
played, player 1 learns the future realizations of nature, while player 2 knows only the
law of the Nature’s random process. Both players learn the whole history of actions
pair. Formally, the strategies of the above 3-players game for players 1 and 2 are
defined as,
• a (pure) strategy Y ∈ {0, 1}n for player 1 is a sequence of mappings Yt :
{0, 1}n×{0, 1}t−1×{0, 1}t−1 → {0, 1}. Yt describes player 1’s action at stage t,
which depends on nature’s sequence X and players’ actions in stages previous
to t.
• a (pure) strategy Z ∈ {0, 1}N for player 2 is a sequence of mappings Zt :
{0, 1}t−1×{0, 1}t−1×{0, 1}t−1 → {0, 1}. Zt describes player 2’s action at stage
t which depends on all past actions.
Therefore, given a sequence X ∈ {0, 1}n for nature and a pair of strategies (Y, Z)
for players 1 and 2 the induced sequences of actions (yn)n and (zn)n of players 1 and
2, respectively, are given by the following relations: (yn)n = Y (X) , (zn)n = Z(X, Y ).
Ultimately, player 1’s actions only depend on nature’s actions, while actions of player
2 depend on player 1’s and nature’s actions.
3.2 Finite repetition
In situations under asymmetric information, players may share information in order
to reduce inefficiencies. Gossner et al. (2006) analyze such situations for infinite
repetition. However, many real situations last a finite amount of time. We apply the
techniques introduced in that paper for finitely repeated environments with asym-
metric information. Let us introduce Gossner et al. strategies construction:
Players’ strategies are defined over blocks of length m < n in such a way that, for
any nature’s sequence X = (xm)m, the proportion of stages for which player 2’s action
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matches nature, zt = xt, is denoted by q ∈ [0, 1]. And, the proportion of stages for
which player 1’s action matches nature, yt = xt, conditional on zt = xt, is p ∈ [0, 1].
Therefore, the proportion of stages in which yt = zt = xt is equal to p · q. Given that
strategies in this game are defined over the space {0, 1}, p · q defines, in turn, each
player’s stage average payoff in the long-run.
Player 1 chooses a sequence (ym)m of actions as a signal for player 2 such that:
• the number of times in which yt = zt = xt is equal to bp · q ·mc.
• among the d(1 − q) ·me stages in which zt 6= xt, it occurs that yt = xt about
half of the times, i.e. b1−q
2
mc .
After the first block has been played, along each block player 2 has to interpret the
signal sent by player 1 during the previous block and then choose her own sequence
(zm)m.
Given a strategy (p, q), the number of blocks of length m fulfilling the above
properties is computed as the product of three combinatorial numbers6. For feasibility,












3.2.1 The information constraint
Reescribirlo todo siguiendo OMP
The entropy function7 is used to measure the amount of information conveyed in






is defined as Γ(m+1)/(Γ(x+1)Γ(m−x+1)). Being Γ(m) the Euler gamma
function that satisfies Γ(m) =
∫∞
0






That means that with one digit is possible to construct the two basic sequences: 0 and 1.
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3.2.2 Entropy and conditional entropy
Let X be a random variable over a finite set Θ with distribution p. The entropy H(X) of X is
H(X) = −Σθ∈Θp(θ) log p(θ) = −EX log p(X)
where 0 log 0 = 0 (by convention log is taken in basis 2). The entropy of a random variable depends
on its distribution only. Thus, for p ∈ ∆(Θ) we let H(p) = H(X) for a random variable X with
distribution p. By convention, if p ∈ [0, 1], H(p) also represents the entropy of a Bernoulli random
variable of parameter p.
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measure the information available to players, individually or as a team. Moreover,
the entropy is also useful to approximate a combinatorial number8 that connects the
number of sequences given by (2) with the amount of information shared by players:
2mH(q)2mqH(p)2m(1−q)H(1/2) ≥ 2m (3)
where H(q) is the amount of information available to player 2 and H(p) the informa-
tion available to player 1. In his own interest, player 1 shares information with player
2, gathering the total amount of information given by the joint entropy H(p, q) which
is defined as,
H(p, q) = H(q) + qH(p) + (1− q)H(1/2) = H(q) + H(p|q) ≥ 1 (4)
The term H(p|q) is the conditional entropy. The first part represents the amount
of information of player 1 when his action matches nature knowing that player 2’s
action also does. The second part represents the amount of information of player
1 when his action matches nature knowing that player 2 does not. Player 2 is a
partial informed agent with imprecise information on nature’s future state, measured
by H(q) and less than the entropy of nature, H(1/2) = 1. Therefore, the amount of
information that player 1 needs to transmit to player 2 to fill in the gap of information
is 1−H(q) ≤ H(p|q). Player 1 does not need to transmit all his private information
to improve his own earnings, and sharing just a part of it is enough for both players
to have incentives to design a joint block strategy (p, q) that will match nature pqm
Given a pair of random variables (X1, X2) taking values in Θ1×Θ2 with joint distribution p(θ1, θ2),
we denote by p(θ2 | θ1) the conditional probability that X2 = θ2 given that X1 = θ1. Define
h(X2 | θ1) = −Σθ2∈Θ2p(θ2 | θ1) log p(θ2 | θ1). Thus h(X2 | θ1) is the entropy of X2 when the
realization X1 = θ1 is known.
The conditional entropy H(X2 | X1) of X2 given X1 is




Direct computation shows that H(X1, X2) = H(X1) + H(X2 | X1). This extends to a family of
random variables (X1, . . . , Xn) to:
H(X1, . . . , Xn) = H(X1) +
n∑
k=2
H(Xk | X1, . . . , Xk−1)
The entropy of a number 0 < x < 1 is defined as H(x) = −xlog2x − (1 − x)log2(1 − x). The
entropy is minimal for x = {0, 1}, H(0) = H(1) = 0, and maximal for x = 1/2, H(1/2) = 1.





is upper bounded by 2mH(x).
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times within a block. The remaining (1 − pq)m times are errors used to transmit
information about the next block.
The fact that the informa- tion used by the agent cannot exceed the information
received leads to an information-theoretic inequality expressed using the Shannon [13]
entropy function, and which we call the information constraint.
Since the coded information is embedded into the error locations, there is a trade-
off between earnings and errors: the fewer the errors, the more coordination and the
higher earnings for players, but the fewer chances to inform on nature’s future state,
which in turn reduces future earnings.
Ultimately, the number of errors depends on the strategy (p, q) that, for feasibility,
must satisfy the information constraint given in (3). Players choose a joint strategy
from the set of feasible strategies S. Let S be the set of pairs (p, q) verifying (3).
Taking logarithms, set S is defined as,
S = {(p, q) : H(q) + qH(p) + (1− q) ≥ 1} (5)
Notice that if p = 1 and q = 1, both players have perfect information and the
information constraint does not work: H(1)+1H(1)+(1−1) = 0 < 1. Consequently,
we have that the set S is a proper subset of [0, 1]× [0, 1]. Moreover, the information
constraint does not depend on the length of the block m.
3.2.3 Coordination strategies in Q
In order to coordinate actions and maximize payoffs, players need to transmit infor-
mation through actions. In a way, players need to perform a communication system
on finite sequences. To do that, the number of matches must be defined as an integer
number and additional definitions are needed into the rational number set Q.
Given a strategy (p, q) on S, let us define the counterpart in rational numbers
as q̃(m) = bqmc
m
, p̃(m) = bpqmcbqmc , m is the size of the block. If q ∈ [0, 1] then q̃ ∈
{0, 1
m
, . . . , m−1
m
, 1}. Similarly, since p ∈ [0, 1] then p̃ ∈ {0, 1
mq̃
, . . . , mq̃−1
mq̃
, 1} .












also the information constraint (4) as,
H(q̃(m)) + q̃(m)H(p̃(m)) + (1− q̃(m)) ≥ 1 (7)
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and we will refer to this constraint as the rational information constraint.
Denote by S̃m the set of pairs (p̃, q̃) in rational number verifying the rational
information constraint9:





, q ∈ [0, 1]
p̃(m) = bpqmcbqmc , p ∈ [0, 1]
H(q̃) + q̃H(p̃) + (1− q̃) ≥ 1}
(8)
Remark 1 The rational information constraint depends on the size of the block m.
H(q̃(m)) + q̃(m)H(p̃(m)) + (1− q̃(m)) ≥ 1 (9)
The following lemma states the existence of rational joint strategies for players 1
and 2 given a fixed length for the block.
Lemma 2 Let n > 0
• There exists m|n such that S̃m 6= 0.
• Let Dn = {m|n : S̃m 6= 0}. There exists m∗ ∈ Dn and (p∗, q∗) ∈ S̃n∗ such that
p∗q∗ is maximal over (p̃(m), q̃(m)) ∈ S̃m,∀n ∈ Dn.
Proof.








Observe that S̃m ⊂ [0, 1] × [0, 1] is a compact set. Therefore, the product
p̃(m)q̃(m) reaches its maximal value in this set.
From the set of pairs (p̃(m), q̃(m)) that verify the rational information con-
straint:
H(q̃(m)) + q̃(m)H(p̃(m)) + (1− q̃(m)) ≥ 1 (10)
We obtain the optimal pair (p∗, q∗) such that the product p∗q∗ reach the maximal
value in S̃m.
9Z denotes the set of positive integer numbers.
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As the entropy approximation provides an upper bound for a combinatorial num-
ber, the rational information constraint (10) is a necessary but not sufficient condition
for a strategy (p̃(m), q̃(m)) to be implementable. Specifically, in the case of blocks of
short length like m = {3, 4}, a strategy may verify the rational information constraint
but not the combinatorial inequality (6). To overcome such cases, we introduce a re-
finement for a strategy to be implementable and define the implementable information




















Notice that we have added a second term to the left-hand side of inequality (6),
representing the total number of m-length sequences with a number of signaling errors
equals m(1− q̃p̃).
4 Experimental set-up
In this subsection we determine and justify the criteria that a sequence and block
lengths has to fulfill in order to be adequate for its implementation in the lab.10 We
then define the optimal strategies for the chosen length of the sequence. Finally, we
describe in detail the design of the experimental session undertaken.
4.1 Sequence and block lengths
In order to find the “right” length of the sequence to be used in the experiment, we
explore several sequence lengths (n) combined with several block lengths (m). In fact
we look for the block strategy (p̃(m), q̃(m)) of length m < n that maximizes earnings
in the length of the sequence (n).
Let us denote as G(n,m) the total payoff obtained in a sequence of length n by
a block strategy of length m: G(n,m) = p̃(m)q̃(m)mb(n,m)m. Being mb(n,m) the




c if n modulo m ≥ m(1− p̃(m)q̃(m))
b n
m
c − 1 otherwise
(12)
10A more extended and preliminary version of this analysis is included in Garćıa-Gallego et al.
(2015).
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Because in the first block players are not able to transmit any information but
just play, any matching in that block occurs by chance. Let n modulo m be the
remainder of the fraction between n and m. If n modulo m is greater than or equal to
the number of errors that are necessary to communicate, i.e m(1− p̃(m)q̃(m)), then
the number of blocks generating payoff is given as the minimum integer number b n
m
c.
Otherwise, the number of blocks is b n
m
c − 1.
Given m, the optimal total earning G∗(n,m) can be obtained by a block strategy
that maximizes the total earnings: G∗(n,m) = maxm G(n,m). Since the solution
to this problem is not unique for n, it is established as the optimal block strategy
(p̃(m∗), q̃(m∗)) the one that has the minimum length, i.e. m∗ = minm arg(G
∗(n,m))
We consider that lengths, in order to be implementable in the lab, should be long
enough for subjects to learn during the game and should have an optimal strategy
easy to be designed during the pre-play stage of the game.
We develop an algorithm that solves the min-max problem. In the first place, we
apply lemma 2 in order to construct strategy sets S̃∗m. Divide the interval [0, 1] into
m disjoint intervals such that:
x
m
≤ q̃(m) < x+1
m
, x = 0, 1, . . . ,m (13)
and call x the number of times player 2 matches nature. For each one of m intervals















Let p̃(m) be conditional on q̃(m) such that:
y
x
≤ p̃(m) < y+1
x
, y = 0, 1, . . . , x, x > 0 (15)













, x 6= 0 (16)
By programming with Mathematica 7.0, we provide strategy sets S̃m. Table 4 in
the Appendix shows the set of optimal strategies verifying the rational information
constraint. As an example, m = 2, 3, 4, 5 the sets are:































































Observe, for example, that the strategy (1, 3
4
) in S̃4 does not fulfill the imple-


















= 12  24 = 16
That means that it is not possible to construct blocks of length m = 4 with only
one signaling mistake. Furthermore, note that 2-length blocks and 3-length blocks
are implementable strategies that need only one signaling mistake.
Given a set of strategies, we are able to optimal strategies by maximizing total
earnings per block. For the sets just considered above, the optimal strategies are:




S̃∗3 = {(1, 23)}










Once the optimal strategies are identified, the next step is evaluating each strat-
egy calculating the earnings associated with them for a given sequence length n =
5, 6, · · · , N . Each combination (n,m) leads to G(n,m) total earnings.
In addition, given that this problem has multiple solutions for the optimal block
length m∗, we require that, for a given sequence length n, the length of the block to
be minimal, that is, m∗ = minm arg(G
∗(n,m)).
Table 7 in the Appendix reports the optimal implementable strategies. Taking
into account all the requirements for a length to be reasonably implementable in the
lab, we choose n = 55. To this sequence length optimally corresponds the block
length m = 3 and the strategy (1, 2
3
) known as majority rule for 3-length blocks, that
we explain next.
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4.2 The majority rule for 3-length block strategy
The 3-length block strategy11 strategy is ruled such that in each block after the first
stage, player 2’s actions match nature’s actions in at least 2 out of the 3 stages. Player
2’s triple action is either (0,0,0) or (1,1,1) in each block, whereas player 1’s actions
signal to player 2 the majority action of nature in the next block. This signaling is
achieved by playing nature’s majority action of the next block in a signaled stage of
the current block. If actions of player 2 match nature’s at all stages of the current
block, then the third stage of the block is the one signaled to signal the majority rule
for the next block. If the actions of player 2 match the sequence of nature in exactly
two out of three stages, the mismatched stage is the one signaled. That strategy
guarantees a per stage payoff of 2/3.
Table 1 shows the 3-length majority rule strategy. Note that there is only one
mistake signaled by player 1’s actions (in bold) and that the total guaranteed payoff
is at least 10 (2 × 5 blocks), and the guaranteed stage average payoff is 10
16
= 0.625.
Furthermore, the signaling action may match the majority action of the current block
1
4
of the times. Thus, there is an additional expected payoff equal to 1.25 (1
4
×5 blocks).
This implies that the stage expected payoff is 11.25
16
= 0.70.




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Nature 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 * 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Payoff * 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1
11The possible binary sequences of length 3 are: (0,0,0), (0,0,1), (0,1,0), (1,0,0), (1,1,0), (1,0,1),
(0,1,1) and (1,1,1). There are four sequences with majority rule 0, and also four with majority rule
1. The probability of the majority rule ‘equals 0’ is given by prob(majority = 0) = prob(000 ∪
001 ∪ 010 ∪ 100) = 4 18 =
1
2 . Similarly, the probability of the majority rule ‘equals 1’is equal to
prob(majority = 1) = prob(110 ∪ 101 ∪ 011 ∪ 111) = 4 18 =
1
2 . Thus, the probability of two
consecutive blocks have the same majority is 12 . The probability that an intended mistake (say
x) becomes a random match is equal to: P (x = majority = 0)P (majority = 0)P (majority =
0) + P (x = majority = 1)P (majority = 1)P (majority = 1) = 14 .
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4.3 Experimental design
The experiment was run at the experimental economics lab at the University of Va-
lencia (LINEEX) in Spain, and consisted of two sessions of 60 subjects each, all third
and fourth year students of Economics, International Business and Business Admin-
istration at that University. In each session, students were grouped in pairs and
randomly assigned a permanent role: Type 1 (plays player 1) or Type 2 (plays player
2).12
At the beginning of the session and before the matching, students performed
several tests. First, the Cognitive Reflexion Test (CRT)13 Second, a Team Work
Test (TWT) of twenty five questions. We used subjects’ performance in the TWT
to rank students from more to less collaborative. Thirty pairs were formed by taking
consecutive people two by two. This way, the pair number 1 was composed by the
two most collaborative ones, and the pair number 30 was formed by the two less
collaborative ones in the sample.
After doing the matching, the instructions of the experiment were given to sub-
jects.14 The decision making of subjects in this experiment consist in playing the
matching pennies repeated game introduced in section 3: a no-player, called Prize,
was defined as an i.i.d random variable taking value 0 or 1 with probability (1
2
). A
55-length random sequence was generated at the beginning of the play phase by a
random number generator. This was common knowledge to both players. Immedi-
ately after, the Type 1 player knew the complete sequence of Prize, while the player
Type 2 did not. After that, subjects started playing the game and, at the beginning
of a new round, each player knew the actions played in the past. Players payoffs were
defined such that, in each round, both players get 1 only if both of them match the
action played by Prize, and zero otherwise. No losses are possible.
In an experimental session, players play twice the coordination game. Specifically,
a session was divided in two parts: In the first part, named Play 1, subjects played
the coordination game during 55 rounds. Immediately after, the second part, named
Play 2, is played. Play 2 is exactly the same as Play 1 but nature plays a different
sequence. Both parts in a session have the same structure: first, the 55 sequence of
nature’s actions is generated and privately transmitted to Type 1 player, and then
both players play the repeated game. At the end of each round, subjects are privately
informed about all actions taken and about individual earnings in that round. As
a result, the two parts of a session differ just in the fact that, when Play 2 starts,
12This experiment is part of the more extended experimental study in Garćıa-Gallego et al. (2013).
13This test measures how reflective a person is in his decision making.
14See the translated version from the original in Spanish in the Appendix.
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subjects have already played Play 1. At the end of each Play, subjects were privately
informed about their final earnings in that part.
Each part, Play 1 and Play 2, had also a pre-play stage of 3 minutes-chat before
the coordination game is played. During the time of the chat, subjects were allowed to
send free-form messages to each other to share information and experience. Subjects
could finish the chat at any moment. Otherwise, the chat would automatically close
once after the three minutes. Once the chat was finished, Type 1 was informed in
private about the sequence of Player 1 and the game started.
The two sequences of a session were randomly generated at the beginning of each
part of the session through a random number generator simulating a ‘0’ and ‘1’ binary
variable, each outcome with a constant probability of 1/2. Subjects were informed
about the computerized random process as being like tossing a coin.
A pilot session of 8 periods was ran for subjects to have an accurate understanding
of the frame of the experiment. Once the pilot finished, the real experiment started.15
At the end of the session, each participant was privately paid in cash. Particularly,
as specified in the instructions, a subject was paid 1 ECU (Experimental Currency
Unit) per round in which all strategies matched. The ECU/Euro exchange rate was
1 ECU = 1
4
Euro. Average payoffs per subject were around 18 Euros.
5 Data analysis and main results
In this section, we first conduct a statistical analysis on the entire sample of the
number of matchings as well as on the respective subsamples corresponding to the
Play 1 and Play 2, second conduct a cluster analysis to identify coordination levels,
then analyze CRT and TWT results including a correlation analysis between CRT
and TWT scores and the number of matchings, and finally perform an econometric
estimation of the theoretical model.
Table ?? reports the main statistics on the number of matchings. In median, the
overall number of matchings is 32, which represents the 58% of success in the 55 rounds
of a play. It emerges that number of rights significantly increases with experience:
subjects improve coordination in the Play 2. In fact, according to Wilcoxon signed-
rank test for the equality of medians, there exists a powerful significant difference
between plays (z = 3.701, p = 0.0002).
15Data from the pilot periods are not reported in our results.
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Table 2: Statistics on matching by play
Descriptive
Statistics Play 1 Play 2 All
Max. 42 44 44
Min. 18 18 18
Average 30.08 33.65 31.87
Median 30 34 32
St.D 5.12 5.72 5.7
Rate 0.55 0.62 0.58
Obs. 60 60 120
‘Rate’ refers to a matching percentage defined
as the quotient between the median and the
length of sequence n=55.
Result 1: Experimental subjects coordinate their actions with experience, arriv-
ing to high levels of coordination in the second play of the session.
We follow to identify the characteristics of coordination clusters by executing
the K-MEANS algorithm (MacQueen, 1967) on the entire sample of the number
of matchings16, and then within each cluster strategies are separated by plays. As
reported in table ??, we identify three clusters corresponding to three coordination
levels:
• Cluster L includes the poorest strategies: strategies in which player 1 plays
nature’s action and player 2 plays at random. Both strategies are naive and
have a correspondence with the theoretical (p, q) = (1, 1
2
), an expected payoff of
1
2
per stage and a total expected payoff over the whole sequence of 55× 1
2
= 27.5.
In practice, 38 out of 120 lab strategies were classified as low coordination and
produced the 47% of success, in median.
• Cluster M includes suboptimal strategies like the one of 2-length block, with
a guaranteed per period payoff of 1 and a per period expected payoff of 5
8
.
Therefore, the total payoff lays within the interval [27.5, 34.37] for the 55-length
sequence. Regarding the lab strategies, 29 out of 120 were classified as medium
coordination with a rate of success of the 56%.
16K-means algoritm is implemented in the scientific program Matlab. The distance measure
applied is the sum of absolute differences, known as the L1 distance. Each centroid is the component-
wise median of the points in that cluster: d(x, c) =
∑p
j=1 |xj − cj |.
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• Cluster H includes the optimal 3-length block strategies, with a guaranteed per
period payoff of 2
3
and a per period expected payoff of 3
4
. The total payoff for
the whole sequence lays in the interval [36.66, 41.25]. The number of strategies
implemented in the experiment considered as high coordination was 53 out
of 120, that means a success of 67%. In spite of the surprising number such
strategies, only 2 out of 53 performed the optimal coding rule.
Table 3: Statistics on matching within coordination clusters
Descriptive Play 1 Play 2 All
Statistics L M H L M H L M H
Average 24.67 29.63 35.35 26.65 32.15 38.27 25.55 30.76 37
Median 26 30 35 27 32 39 26 31 37
St.D 2.52 1.78 2.31 3.55 2.19 2.41 3.14 2.32 2.76
Rate 0.47 0.55 0.64 0.49 0.58 0.71 0.47 0.56 0.67
Obs. 21 16 23 17 13 30 38 29 53
‘Rate’ refers to a matching percentage defined as the quotient between the median
and the length of sequence n=55.
As mentioned in the subsection 4.3 the participants of the experiment were face
a Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) composed by 3 questions and a Team Work Test
(TWT) of 25 questions17 in the likert scale from 1 to 4, meaning 1 no cooperative at
all and 4 absolutely cooperative18. Participants, separate by role player 1 and player
2, were sorted in decreasing order according to their TWT score, and then each
participant was paired to the counterpart in the same order to form a permanent
pair. Thus, the pair 1, the highest scored pair, score would be presumably the most
inclined to coordinate each other, whereas the pair 30, the lowest scored pair, would
be the less inclined to coordinate each other. Therefore, we would expect to find a
positive relation between coordination and TWT score in our experiment.
Figure 1 plots the distributions of TWT and CRT scores. Panel (a) shows the
overall distributions by types of players, which indicate homogenous groups regard-
ing to subjects’ attitudes towards cooperation and reflection. Furthermore, by coor-
dination levels, subjects exhibit no significant differences in such attitudes: median
TWT(CRT) score was around 78(13.98), in overall. Panel (b) represents the distri-
bution of players’ TWT scores by play and cluster. Looking at the left of the graph,
17See appendix for question test.
18The maximal score is 100 and the minimal score is 25.
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we find that 12 out of 21 pairs coordinated at level L in Play 1 enhanced coordina-
tion in Play 2. In contrast, at the right of the graph, we find that 7 out of 23 pairs
coordinated at level H in Play 1 diminished coordination in Play 2. The distributions
of TWT scores by coordination levels look like really different, which indicates that
there is no relation between such scores and coordination. In fact, the coefficient
of Pearson’s correlation between the number of matchings and TWT scores is not
significant, neither between the number of matchings and CRT scores nor between
TWT scores and CRT scores. This evidence leads to the following result:
Result 2: Experimental subjects’ attitudes towards reflection and cooperation
do not matter to coordination.
20
(a) TWT and CRT scores by type of player
(b) TWT scores by cluster and type of player
Figure 1: Distributions of CRT and TWT scores
5.1 Coordination strategies (p, q) in the lab
In the pure matching pennies game coordination is tacit and random. In contrast, in
our matching pennies game coordination is also tacit but not random.
Players jointly define a coordination strategy before playing the game, which al-
lows to assure their matching and payoff. Superior coordination strategies convey
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more information that player 2 decodes according to a joint coordination rule and
matches nature’s action in proportion q.Player 1 makes one or more mistakes to in-
form his partner about nature future playing. Thus, player 1 matches both player
2 and nature’s actions in the proportion p1, while matches just nature’s actions in
proportion p2.
As far as the corresponding experimental strategies for proportions (p, q), as al-
ready defined in Section 3, the evidence is the following:
• Figure 2 reports proportions q in Plays 1 and 2 distributed by coordination
cluster. Firstly, the median values are increasing in coordination, and higher in
the Play 2. In overall, there exists a powerful significant difference of medians
between both plays (z = −3.610, p = 0.0003).
• However, in the case of proportions p1 and p2 no differences of medians are
found between plays (z = 0.936, p = 0.3494; z = −0.738, p = 0.4608).19
• Regarding the relation between player 1 ’s and player 2’s decisions. On the
one hand, the proportion p1 exhibits an overall negative coefficient of Pearson’s
correlation with the proportion q (corr = −0.474, p = 0.0001). In other words,
because player 1 uses mistakes to inform the player 2 about the nature’s next
actions, the higher p1 is the lower the number of mistakes is and therefore the
less information is transmitted and, as a result of coordination strategy, the
lower the number of player 1’s chances to match nature q is. On the other
hand, the proportion p2 is uncorrelated with the proportions q and p1 since the
corresponding coefficient of correlations are not statistically significant at con-
ventional levels. That means that the player 1’s decision is random (theoretical
optimal value is p2 =
1
2
) when player 2 does not match nature.
All these findings lead to our third result.
Result 3: The behavior of player 1 induces the behavior of player 2. Being
information transmission based on the mistakes (1−p1) of player 1 that are interpreted
by and converted in rights (q) of player 2.
19It is applied Wilcoxon signed-rank test for the equality of medians.
22
Figure 2: Player 2’s matching frequency by cluster
5.2 Logit model estimation
According to the theoretical model, codification rules implicitly define player 1 and
player 2 matching proportions p and q, which, in turn, determine the long term
average payoff (p · q ·n). In previous sections, we characterized the optimal pair (p, q)
= (1, 2
3
) for a finite sequence of nature of length 55, being the corresponding strategy
the majority rule for 3-length blocks. In this subsection, we estimate the models of
players behavior by binary logit models.
We first estimate the model of player 2. If information transmission exists, the
decisions of players 2 will depend on nature and the previous decisions of players
1, which is included by lagging one and two periods the variable representing the
decisions of player 1. Also, dummies variables to catch the effect of coordination
clusters M and H are added. Furthermore, the model estimation with the entire
sample include dummies per session and play.
Regarding the estimation of the model of player 1, we estimate the probability p1,
which is conditional on the player 2 matches nature’s action, and then estimate the
probability p2, which is conditional on the player 2 does not match nature’s action.
In this case, the only explanatory variable is nature’s action and also dummies per
cluster and session are included.
Table 6 reports the logistic regression marginal effects of probabilities q, p1, and
p2 for the entire sample and each play.
We find a positive effect of nature intervention on q. In other words, when na-
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ture’s action changes from ‘0’ to ‘1’, then q increases, and viceversa. Concerning the
entire sample, we find significant both the one and two lagged actions of player 1.
When player 1 changes his action from ‘1’ to ‘0’ q diminishes one period later, but
increases two periods later. Additionally, Play 2, clusters M and H have positive
effects on coordination, and also Session 1 distinguishes from Session 2 by increasing
coordination. By interpreting the marginal effects per Plays 1 and 2, we only com-
ment relevant differences: when player 1 changes his action from ‘1’ to ‘0’ q always
diminishes in Play 1, and Session 1 does not show differences from Session 2.
A positive marginal effect between the probability p1 and nature indicates that
player 1 follows nature. Nevertheless, the smarter players 1 (in cluster H) make
signaling mistakes to inform at the cost of diminishing p1. It is worth to comment
that in Play 2 of Session 1, players 1 make more mistakes than in Session 2 as indicated
by the negative marginal effect of dummy Session 1
Regarding probability p2, it is remarkable the negative effect that Session 1 has
on such probability, which might conceal over-signaling in Session 1. In contrast,
clusters M and H have significant positive effect on the probability p2.
Result 4: Some mis-signaling is observed in the behavior of player 1 subjects.
When player 2 matches nature’s action, player 1’s and nature’s actions match around
the 98% of the times, on average. Whereas when player 2 does not match nature’s
action, player 1 matches nature’s action significantly less in session 1 than in session
2 -around 25.99% less in session 1.
6 Conclusions
How efficiently players can coordinate under certain conditions in the lab is the scope
of this paper. Specifically, our experimental set up has been inspired by the repeated
matching pennies game with asymmetric information already introduced by Gossner
et al. (2003, 2006). In their paper, Gossner et al. design optimal strategies of
communication between sender and receiver in an infinitely repeated set-up. The
authors use a binary information source and model the uncertainty coming from
nature as a no-player playing a binomial random variable taking either the value
0 or 1 (each with probability 1/2). Players are characterized by their information
available: the sender has private information on the future state of nature; while the
receiver has public information about the history of nature’s past states. The role of
the strategic interaction is crucial since the gains of players are mutually conditional.
Given that there is a positive gain when both players match nature’s, the sender has
an incentive to share information in order to improve his own gains. Thus, actions’
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coordination is possible being a strictly dominant strategy for both players. The main
finding of that paper is the construction of optimal strategies based on communication
blocks.
In order to create the correct experimental environment for testing the set-up
described above, we first have determined that the length n = 55 is the appropriate
for the finite sequence to be generated randomly by nature. We have then provided
a theoretical characterization for strategies designed and implemented under that
experimental environment.
More specifically we have provided an information constraint with rational num-
bers that we call the rational information constraint. This constraint takes into
consideration the fact that the number of bytes available for players to transmit
information is finite. Furthermore, such a constraint is a necessary condition for com-
munication to be possible but it is not sufficient, since an operational communication
device should be implementable. To that purpose, we introduce as a refinement, the
implementable information constraint, which is expressed in terms of combinatorial
numbers. Therefore, this refinement takes into account the number of finite binary
sequences under the requirements of the strategy of the two players.
We have implemented in the lab a specific channel for communication between
players: previously to the playing of the game, a chat is activated during 3 minutes.
During this time, players had the possibility to write free messages hopefully designing
their strategies without explicit cost. How much information is transmitted depends
on how informative the signal of player 1 is and how receptive player 2 is in receiving
the signal. This will eventually determine the payoff of the two players. Here we have
analysed the effectiveness of that chat on transmitting information in the terms of
the theoretical model. That is, without specifically analysing what the messages in
the chat contain, we have tested whether and how much did players coordinate under
such conditions and, therefore, whether the model predicts reasonable strategies that
could be observed from real heterogeneous agents.
Among our main experimental results we find that subjects design strategies at
three levels of coordination. First, strategies at low level where the receiver ignores or
misunderstands the sender’s message, coordinating actions by pure chance. Second, a
medium level of coordination in which strategies transmit successfully information by
following a joint coordination code. A third level of coordination, the richest, where
coordination codes achieve payoffs close to the optimal predicted by the theoretical
model. Overall, we confirm that subjects coordinate their actions with experience,
arriving to high levels of coordination in the second play of the session.
In a further analysis of the data, we have applied binary logit models. Theoreti-
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cally, actions of player 2 depend on nature’s and player 1’s behavior. Moreover, the
full informed player 1 coordinates with the uninformed player 2 via a coordination
strategies that are designed during the pre-play phase. Consequently, what player 1
does in the game depends only on nature’s actions, this fact being common knowledge
by the two players before the game starts. From our logit estimation of the match-
ing probabilities we obtain that the behavior of player 2 subjects is significantly
explained by actions taken by nature and the corresponding player 1. Moreover,
player 1’s action shift conveys nature’s action mostly played. As far as player 1 sub-
jects is concerned, there is somehow mis-signaling in the sense that, when player 2
matches nature, player 1 makes mistakes in excess thus deviating from the theoretical
prediction. However, if we measure the deviations taking coordination clusters, we
calculate that deviations are small, between 2% and 11%. When player 2 does not
match nature, we find opposite evidence from our data. In particular, in session 1
the estimated probability is much lower than the theoretical prediction, which can be
interpreted as over-signaling, while in session 2 the contrary happens, which evidences
under-signaling. Some mis-signaling is observed in the behavior of player 1 subjects.
Sumarising, we conclude that communication reduces inefficiencies and players
follow a class of strategies, the block strategies, salient in the literature of repeated
games in general and in Gossner et al. in particular. Finally, it is quite significant,
that very little experience is enough to make a difference in the implementation by the
part of informed players of strategies using mistakes, or strategic signaling, to convey
information even in complex setups of dynamic environments under uncertainty.
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7 Appendix 1: Instructions of the experiment (trans-
lated from Spanish)
You are going to participate in an experimental session that will give you the possi-
bility to earn some money in cash. How much money you will ultimately take will
depend on luck and your and others’ decisions. Please switch off your mobile phone
and leave your things to one side. For your participation in the session you need just
the instructions and the computer on your desk. Please raise your hand if you have
any questions, and one of us will see to it privately.
In this experiment, you will be paired with another participant, who will not
change throughout the session. A pair is composed of two types of participants:
‘Type 1’ and ‘Type 2’. At the beginning of the session, the computer will randomly
assign you a role and display it on your screen. The experiment is divided into two
plays of 55 rounds each. At the beginning of each play, the computer will randomly
determine, for every round, a value that may be either 0 or 1. This value will be
called ‘Prize’. In each round, the probability that the Prize is associated to 0 or to 1
is exactly the same: 50% (it is like tossing a coin). Each of value will determine your
earnings in each round, according to the following rules.
Each round, your decision making consists in choosing either 0 or 1. In each pair,
the two participants simultaneously choose either 0 or 1 taking into account that:
- If the decisions of both participants coincide with the Prize, they both get 1
ECU each in that round.
- If at least one decision within the pair does not coincide with Prize, then both
get nothing in that round.
At the beginning of each block, you will have 3 minutes to communicate with
your partner through a chat. You can end the chat at any time before the end by
clicking on the option ‘Exit from the chat’. Every message sent through the chat will
be recorded and carefully analyzed by the those conducting the experiment. At the
end of each round, your screen will display information concerning the value of the
‘Prize’ (0 or 1), the decision of your partner (0 or 1) and your own decision in that
round.
To be ‘Type 1’ or ‘Type 2’ has consequences:
- If you are ‘Type 1’, at the beginning of each block of 55 rounds, and after using
the chat to communicate with your partner, you will be aware of the sequence of
values of the Prize that corresponds to that block.
- If you are ‘Type 2’, you will be aware of the value of the Prize at the end of each
round.
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Moreover, participant ‘the agent’ knows that participant ‘the wiser’ will be aware
of the values of Prize for each block just after the chat time. the wiser knows that
the agent will have that information at the end of each round.
Earnings
At the end of each block, the participants in the experiment will know the number
of winning rounds. At the end of the session, you will be paid your total payoff in
cash, that is, the total number of rounds (in the two blocks of 55) in which you won
the prize of 1 ECU. The exchange rate between ECUs and Euros is 1 ECU=1/4 Euro.
30
8 Appendix 2: Tables 6 and 7
Table 4: Optimal strategies for blocks of length m = {2, 3, 4, . . . , 27} under a rational
information constraint.




















































































































































































































































































Table 5: Optimal implementable strategies for sequences of length n = {5, 6, . . . , 60}.
n m∗ p∗ q∗ p∗q∗ gain/block m∗(1− p∗q∗) nb(n,m∗) total earnings
5 2 1 1/2 1/2 1 1 2 2
6 2 1 1/2 1/2 1 1 2 2
7 3 1 2/3 2/3 2 1 2 4
8 3 1 2/3 2/3 2 1 2 4
9 2 1 1/2 1/2 1 1 4 4
9 3 1 2/3 2/3 2 1 2 4
10 3 1 2/3 2/3 2 1 3 6
11 3 1 2/3 2/3 2 1 3 6
12 5 3/4 4/5 3/5 3 2 2 6
13 3 1 2/3 2/3 2 1 4 8
14 3 1 2/3 2/3 2 1 4 8
15 3 1 2/3 2/3 2 1 4 8
16 3 1 2/3 2/3 2 1 5 10
17 3 1 2/3 2/3 2 1 5 10
18 3 1 2/3 2/3 2 1 5 10
19 3 1 2/3 2/3 2 1 6 12
20 3 1 2/3 2/3 2 1 6 12
21 3 1 2/3 2/3 2 1 6 12
22 3 1 2/3 2/3 2 1 7 14
23 10 7/8 4/5 7/10 7 3 2 14
24 10 7/8 4/5 7/10 7 3 2 14
25 3 1 2/3 2/3 2 1 8 16
26 3 1 2/3 2/3 2 1 8 16
27 3 1 2/3 2/3 2 1 8 16
28 3 1 2/3 2/3 2 1 9 18
29 3 1 2/3 2/3 2 1 9 18
30 13 9/10 10/13 9/13 9 4 2 18
31 3 1 2/3 2/3 2 1 10 20
32 6 4/5 5/6 2/3 4 2 5 20
33 10 7/8 4/5 7/10 7 3 3 21
34 3 1 2/3 2/3 2 1 11 22
35 3 1 2/3 2/3 2 1 11 22
36 11 8/9 9/11 8/11 8 3 3 24
37 3 1 2/3 2/3 2 1 12 24
38 3 1 2/3 2/3 2 1 12 24
39 3 1 2/3 2/3 2 1 12 24
40 3 1 2/3 2/3 2 1 13 26
41 18 13/15 5/6 13/18 13 5 2 26
42 18 13/15 5/6 13/18 13 5 2 26
43 10 7/8 4/5 7/10 7 3 4 28
44 10 7/8 4/5 7/10 7 3 4 28
45 20 15/16 4/5 3/4 15 5 2 30
46 3 1 2/3 2/3 2 1 15 30
47 11 8/9 9/11 8/11 8 3 4 32
48 11 8/9 9/11 8/11 8 3 4 32
49 15 11/12 4/5 11/15 11 4 3 33
50 15 11/12 4/5 11/15 11 4 3 33
51 15 11/12 4/5 11/15 11 4 3 33
52 3 1 2/3 2/3 2 1 17 34
53 10 7/8 4/5 7/10 7 3 5 35
54 24 9/10 5/6 3/4 18 6 2 36
55 3 1 2/3 2/3 2 1 18 36
56 25 19/20 4/5 19/25 19 6 2 38
57 25 19/20 4/5 19/25 19 6 2 38
58 11 8/9 9/11 8/11 8 3 5 40
59 11 8/9 9/11 8/11 8 3 5 40
60 11 8/9 9/11 8/11 8 3 5 40
32
33
T
ab
le
6:
L
og
it
m
o
d
el
m
ar
gi
n
al
eff
ec
ts
P
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
q
P
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
p 1
P
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
p 2
A
ll
P
la
y
1
P
la
y
2
A
ll
P
la
y
1
P
la
y
2
A
ll
P
la
y
1
P
la
y
2
N
at
u
re
.1
75
8
.2
24
2
.1
09
4
.0
13
6
.0
20
0
.0
10
0
.0
40
8
.1
17
0
-.
03
16
(1
1.
77
)*
**
(1
0.
73
)*
**
(5
.0
9)
**
*
(2
.8
7)
**
*
(2
.9
6)
**
*
(1
.5
1)
(2
.0
0)
**
(4
.2
6)
**
*
(-
1.
00
)
P
la
ye
r
1
-.
02
54
3
-.
06
54
.0
20
40
(-
1.
49
)
(-
2.
72
)*
**
(1
.0
0)
P
la
ye
r
1(
-1
)
-.
03
36
-.
04
90
-.
01
87
(-
2.
10
)*
*
(-
2.
18
)*
*
(-
.8
3)
P
la
ye
r
1(
-2
)
.0
46
9
-.
04
50
.0
48
4
(3
.1
2)
**
*
(2
.0
8)
**
*
(2
.3
3)
**
P
la
y
2
.0
54
8
(4
.3
0)
**
*
S
es
si
on
1
.0
29
0
.0
04
0
.0
53
0
-.
00
43
.0
07
3
-.
01
41
-.
25
99
-.
22
64
-.
26
34
(2
.2
8)
**
(.
22
)
(2
.9
6)
**
*
(-
1.
03
)
(1
.4
6)
(-
2.
13
)*
*
(-
13
.7
5)
**
*
(-
8.
51
)*
**
(-
9.
00
)*
**
C
lu
st
er
M
.0
93
6
.0
89
6
.1
03
2
.0
07
3
-.
00
02
.0
12
3
.1
57
8
-.
01
44
.3
78
6
(5
.9
6)
**
*
(4
.0
3)
**
*
(4
.6
9)
**
*
(1
.0
3)
(-
.0
3)
(1
.2
3)
(6
.3
4)
**
*
(-
.4
4)
(1
1.
32
)*
**
C
lu
st
er
H
.2
21
6
.0
20
9
.2
32
7
-.
01
97
-.
02
10
-.
01
54
.0
23
8
-.
03
73
.1
19
2
(1
6.
07
)*
**
(1
0.
45
)*
**
(1
2.
04
)*
**
(-
3.
25
)*
**
(-
2.
42
)*
*
(-
1.
91
)*
(1
.0
1)
(-
1.
15
)
(3
.4
6)
**
*
N
6,
36
0
3,
18
0
3,
18
0
3,
92
3
1,
84
4
2.
07
9
2,
68
6
1,
45
6
1,
23
0
L
og
li
ke
li
h
o
o
d
-4
06
3.
14
97
-2
06
6.
75
71
-1
98
4.
89
34
-4
43
.4
86
4
-1
75
.9
87
8
-2
61
.9
93
4
-1
73
2.
95
47
-9
48
.2
93
8
-7
46
.4
85
9
P
se
u
d
o
R
2
.0
52
4
.0
52
0
.0
50
7
.0
40
7
.0
68
7
.0
36
2
.0
65
5
.0
53
5
.1
23
2
p
re
d
ic
te
d
p
ro
b
.
.6
03
8
.5
65
3
.6
41
5
.9
79
3
.9
85
0
.9
75
9
.4
59
4
.4
46
5
.4
79
7
G
o
o
d
n
es
s
.6
41
5
.6
18
5
.6
71
6
.9
74
7
.9
78
8
.9
71
1
.6
33
2
.6
40
1
.6
89
4
T
h
e
m
ea
su
re
of
go
o
d
n
es
s
is
b
as
ed
on
th
e
2x
2
h
it
s
an
d
m
is
se
s
ta
b
le
an
d
th
e
th
re
sh
ol
d
p
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
is
0.
5.
F
ig
u
re
s
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
is
a
re
th
e
p
se
u
d
o
t-
va
lu
es
of
es
ti
m
at
or
s:
∗
∗
∗
at
1%
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
ce
le
ve
l;
∗∗
at
5%
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
ce
le
ve
l;
an
d
∗
at
10
%
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
ce
le
ve
l.
34
